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ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
The authors of this paper propose an 
approach to studying risk management in 
the most vulnerable monotowns that would 
account for the relations between major 
stakeholders and use the tools developed in 
the framework of the new institutional eco-
nomic theory. 
Having compared the existing defini-
tions of the “monotown” concept, the au-
thors present their own approach. They 
identify key reasons behind monotown vul-
nerability and systematize stakeholders’ 
risks. The authors then posit that a study of 
monotown-related issues would be incom-
plete without accounting for stakeholders’ 
interests and relations. Monotown problems 
become apparent in the context of institu-
tional agreements carried out with high 
transition costs and increased risks of op-
portunistic behaviour encountered by the 
institutional agreement stakeholders. Solv-
ing these problems through the methods 
proposed in the article would help to identi-
fy a wider range of alternatives while still 
taking into account all the typical scenar-
ios. The authors analyse the process of risk 
management in monotowns from the view-
point of international practices; and iden-
tify structural alternatives of outweighing 
these risks by considering key relations af-
fecting the implementation of each alter-
native. 
 
Key words: monotown, risk manage-
ment, stakeholders, structural alternatives, 
institutional agreements. 
 
Introduction 
 
Regardless of any circumstances 
and obstacles, one of the key priorities 
of long-term economic policy is creat-
ing mechanisms for sustainable eco-
nomic development. Sustainable devel-
opment of Russia as a whole isn’t pos-
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 5 
sible without sustainable development of its regional system comprised of 
cities as structural elements. Special attention should be paid to towns fo-
cused on a single industry. Their significance is explained not only by a high 
proportion of their population and output, but also by increased vulnerability 
to various shocks that can trigger the domino effect. The processes that have 
a negative impact on the country’s economy are especially pronounced in 
monotowns, since such territorial units are more vulnerable to abrupt chang-
es in their environment. Moreover, this reaction is not always accompanied 
by adequate adaptation measures that would ensure the stability of a mono-
town’s economy as well as that of the national economy. 
In the current conditions, positive and stable changes in the monotown 
situation require mechanisms of adaptation to changes in the environment 
without a regular inflow of federal resources. The solution to this problem is 
based on the search for development, and application of radically new ap-
proaches to studying the socioeconomic position of monotowns and improv-
ing mechanisms of risk management for such urban areas. 
This work aims to propose an approach to studying the issues of manag-
ing monotown risks in view of the relations between the key interest groups. 
Despite the fact that the monotown problem has been widely discussed 
by both researchers and politicians, there is no single definition of a 
monotown. That is why the first section of the article is dedicated to an 
overview of approaches to defining the object and the formulation of a work-
ing definition within the conceptual framework of monotown studies. The 
second part of the article focuses on the cause of monotown vulnerability 
and associated risks. The third part considers ways to mitigate these risks. It 
lays out key provisions of a conceptually new approach to discussing the 
monotown issues in the context of success and international practices using 
the elements of new institutional economics. The conclusion summarises key 
arguments. 
 
 
1. A relationship-based reincarnation of the monotown concept 
 
Today, according to the official data of the Government of the Russian 
Federation, 313 out of 1100 monotowns (i.e. almost 30 %) are single-
industry municipalities [23]. In terms of population, this ratio translates into 
13.5 million people living in such towns. At the regional level, the propor-
tions of monotown population are as follows (fig. 1, FD stands for federal 
district): 
In other words, almost every tenth Russian citizen lives in a monotown (or 
a single-industry settlement). As figure 1 shows, this circumstance is of special 
significance in three federal districts: the Volga, Ural, and Siberian ones. 
Despite the fact that modern economic studies offer a wide range of 
definitions of the term ‘monotown,’ there is no single explicitly specified 
conceptual framework. In some cases, ‘monotown,’ ‘single-industry settle-
ment,’ and ‘factory town’ or ‘company-town’ are used as synonyms. Mono-
town is defined as a monocentric city in view of the prevalent employment 
industry and the activities of working-age population [2]. It is worth noting 
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that this definition narrows the set of monotowns in one sense and broadens 
in another. It is the case if one compares it with the following definition: a 
town with a single major employer functioning on its territory [7]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Population concentration in Russian monotowns 
(percentage of the total population of corresponding federal districts, as of 2014) 
 
Source: compiled by the authors based on Rosstat data and Governmental De-
cree No. 1398-r of July 29, 2014 
 
In other words, a monotown is a settlement with such a close relationship 
between the functioning of a large company (the principal employer) and the 
economic and social aspects of the town’s life that the future of the town de-
pends on the prospects of the company’s functioning and development [6]. 
The previous definition permits the possibility of several single-industry 
companies. As shown below, under certain conditions, these definitions will 
not contradict each other. 
Giving a working definition and identifying its key characteristics are 
relevant not only for positive studies, but also for devising an economic pol-
icy, since these processes affect not only the assessment of the scale of prob-
lems and the degree of diversity but also the development of solutions. 
It is worth noting that Russian legislation does not give an unambiguous 
definition of the notion of ‘monotown.’ Governmental Decree No. 121 “On 
the Federal Programme for Public Support for Small Businesses in the Rus-
sian Federation in 2000—2001” of February 14, 2000 defines monotowns as 
towns formed by a city-forming company. The Governmental Decree No. 
1001 “On the Procedure of Classifying Companies as City-Forming and Par-
ticularities of Selling Town-forming Companies of Debtors” lays down the 
following criteria for classifying companies as town-forming: 
— the company employs at least 30 % of total population working at the 
town’s companies; 
— its assets include public utilities and engineering infrastructure pro-
viding services to at least 30 % of the town’s population [22]. 
A. Shastitko, A. Fatikhova 
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Earlier, the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation 
formulated the following criteria for classifying towns as single-industry 
ones: 
1. The town is home to a company or several companies operating 
within a single manufacturing process and employing more than 25 % of the 
working age population [19]. 
2. The town is home to a company or several companies operating 
within a single manufacturing processes and accounting for 50 % of the total 
industrial output. 
Additionally, taxes and levies transferred to the municipality by a local 
company or several companies operating within a single manufacturing 
process should account for at least 20 % of the total amount of taxes and lev-
ies transferred to the municipality by all organisations and companies. 
It should also be noted that the threshold values of indicators that could 
be used to describe key characteristics of a monotown are often employed to 
identify monotowns as objects of economic policy. All else being equal, the 
higher the value, the more pronounced are the monotown characteristics. 
However, the development of a non-technocratic approach to studying 
the monotown problem requires paying attention to an alternative opinion 
based on identifying (more precisely, summarising) additional criteria for 
single-industry towns [9]: 
1) one or several companies function within one industry, their produc-
tion output is aimed at a narrow market segment; all the other local compa-
nies meet the needs of the town’s population [11]; 
2) the town is characterised by an intricately structured activity of inter-
related companies catering for the same final market (except for the compa-
nies meeting the needs of the town’s population) [7]; 
3) transfers to the municipality heavily depend on sales of the town-
forming company; 
4) the town’s population specialises in a single professional field, the di-
versification of population’s employment areas is rather complicated; 
5) remoteness from economic centres coupled with the absence of a 
well-organised transport infrastructure hampers population mobility; the 
town becomes an isolated territorial unit. 
The analysis of publications and laws and regulations on monotowns 
shows that existing approaches to their definition are contradictory and 
based on different classification criteria. At the same time, a comparison of 
different approaches makes it possible to produce an image necessary for 
conceptualising the notion of monotown. This image corresponds to the last 
of the described approaches, however, it focuses on the nature of relations 
between key stakeholders in a monotown. 
Firstly, a monotown is a town that is highly dependent on the perform-
ance of a single company. Therefore, it is worth noting that there can be sev-
eral companies but the nature of their relations and associated problem will 
be the same. 
There can be several companies producing similar items. A change in the 
conditions of demand for their produce has a one-way effect and, thus, af-
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fects the overall results of the companies’ performance (as well as the taxa-
tion base). If, technically, there are several production facilities owned by 
independent companies, the changes in the market situation produce reso-
nance effect similar to return on an asset portfolio that is not diversified by 
risks or returns. Therefore, in the case of negative shocks, the employees of 
one company do not have an opportunity to switch to a comparable alterna-
tive, since (a) economic centres are remote, (b) the town’s production facili-
ties owned by different companies are facing the same situation, and (c) the 
town’s companies oriented towards meeting the needs of the population are 
unlikely to absorb the laid-off workforce. 
Secondly, the process chain production facilities, which are closely con-
nected and have no other alternative connections, can function both within 
one company and in the framework of contractual relationships between 
companies with different owners but with prohibitively high costs of switch-
ing to alternative suppliers (and customers) beyond the town limits1 (more 
precisely, the town’s economic boundaries in view of the transport accessi-
bility costs). For companies within the process chain, the effect of a chang-
ing economic situation is similar to that considered above. The only differ-
ence is the possibility of problems resulting not from the general deteriora-
tion of the situation but from the decisions made at the level of large compa-
nies representing one of the process chain’s links, when negative external 
effects are not internalised due to the absence of mechanisms of analysing 
negative consequences for the companies. Therefore, due to significant 
switching costs, the instability of contractual relations within value added 
chains becomes another important element of the monotown definition2. 
Therefore, the dependence of the situation in the city on the situation at 
production facilities of one or several companies that are either connected or 
manufacture similar products is associated with a significant economic (not 
obligatory geographical) distance. This results in considerable switching 
costs in functional and spatial terms, also for the working-age population 
that accounts for a significant percentage of voters. For the sake of simplifi-
cation, some issues can be considered with an assumption that the whole 
population is of working age and has the right to vote. 
Costs require special attention, since they point to the problems of con-
tractual relationship organisation, well known from the economic theory of 
transaction costs. First of all, it concerns constructing mechanisms of inter-
                                                     
1 A good example is the organisation of concrete production in the town of Pikaly-
ovo, the Leningrad region, which is based on alumina production waste. A waste 
supply disruption in the absence of an economically justified opportunity to switch 
to alternative suppliers due to extremely long transportation distance resulted in 
mass layoffs and a sharp deterioration in the population’s well-being (even against 
the background of the crisis phenomena observed in Russian in late 2008/early 
2009) and an increase in social tension.  
2 From this perspective, it is worth stressing an important comment to the monotown 
definition: the context of economic policy requires paying attention to same-type 
negative consequences that can arise from a wide range of similar initial conditions 
of the organisation of relations in monotowns. 
A. Shastitko, A. Fatikhova 
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action between economic agents in the situations of specific assets, quasi rent 
distribution, and mitigating the problem of opportunistic behaviour — the as-
pects that gain significance in the context of contractual approach to studying 
the monotown problems; some elements of this approach have been developed 
by the Russian economists [26]. Therefore, the problem of opportunism asso-
ciated with asset specificity arises, at least, in the following relations: 
1) business to business relations (in value added chains within the 
town’s economy and beyond it); 
2) business/employee relations (due to the employees’ limited switching 
opportunities); 
3) authorities/taxpayer relations (both business and employees3); 
4) authorities/population relations (as the recipient of municipal serviced 
financed by the municipality). 
Therefore, in this ‘reference system,’ the town’s budget and capacity to 
provide different public and socially significant services also depend on (a) 
the situation at the town-forming companies and (b) the relations between 
the company owners and local authorities representing the interests of the 
population in the context of the ‘principal/agent’ relations. 
 
2. The key sources of monotowns’ vulnerability 
 
When speaking of the economic development of modern Russia, it is 
logical to start from the economic situation in monotowns. They demonstrate 
the whole range of consequences resulting from the recurrence of the same 
major problems of the country’s economy4. 
Let us consider each cause of the vulnerability of monotowns and, there-
fore, the increased risks of critical situations. 
The first is a reduction in the increase in monotowns as compared to the 
beginning of the 21st century, as well as a trend towards a reduction in the 
number of monotowns with a large population (50 to 100 thousand people). 
This situation points not to the termination of cultivating new territories for 
creating town-forming companies but rather to a trend towards the internal 
migration of monotowns’ population to more developed multi-industry cit-
ies. For instance, a number of monotowns in the regions of the Far Eastern 
federal district were reclassified as villages due to the mass emigration of 
working-age population. The problem stems from a global crisis of town-
forming companies. Their produce is not competitive; costs of production 
maintenance are extremely high; most fixed assets are beyond their opera-
tional lifetime. This gives rise to a more serious problem — the insufficient 
amount of qualified human resources — which hampers the acceleration of mo-
notown revitalisation (in the cases when there are grounds for revitalisation). 
The second is the narrow specialisation of monotown’s economic activi-
ties, which is a serious barrier to development. Monotowns’ development is 
vulnerable to the slightest fluctuations in the environment and has no ability 
                                                     
3 It is assumed that local taxes are paid by the employees of town-forming compa-
nies. These include not only income but also property taxes. 
4 Also literally: under certain conditions, narrow specialisation of the economy can 
generate problems not unlike those faced by monotowns. 
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to resist negative external effects. Changes in the external market situation, 
decreasing demand, as well as plummeting prices of goods sold by the town-
forming company can cast a monotown’s economy in a state of acute crisis, 
which may only be overcome by using significant financial resources. The 
statement is proven by both the economic instability of the 1990s and the 
2008—2009 economic and financial crisis: the socioeconomic situation in 
monotowns was the most depressive throughout the country; at the same 
time, monotowns affect the economic situation nationwide. According to 
some estimates, the actual unemployment rate in Russia ranged from 7 to 
7.5 % at the beginning of the 2008 crisis, whereas in monotowns it reached 
approximately 30 % [27]. 
The third is the fact that a wide range of problems is accounted for by 
longstanding lack of a consistent policy for preventing crises in monotowns. 
In particular, there is a need for a single legal framework for adopting gov-
ernmental measures aimed at stabilising the situation in monotowns (namely, 
sustaining town-forming companies and social support). As mentioned 
above, today, there is no legally established definition of the concepts of 
‘monotown’ and ‘single-industry territorial unit’; however, these terms are 
used in number of regulations and regional decrees. The government defines 
the term ‘multi-industry’ through the prism of the town-forming company, 
which would affect the budget balance in case it is sold or faces bankruptcy. 
Moreover, the unfavourable situation in monotowns is aggravated by a sys-
tem of hierarchical budget relations. In accordance with the current tax dis-
tribution system, only 20 kopeks out of 1 rouble of taxes collected in a town 
stay there [24]. As a result, the municipality’s administration loses interest in 
creating favourable conditions for the town’s economic development. It 
seems that an evident solution would be an increase in the proportion of 
taxes and levies transferred to the municipality. However, such measures are 
not taken. Moreover, federal law No 122-FZ of August 22, 2014 abolishing 
tax transfers to the municipalities of certain monotowns (research 
monotowns and closed territorial administrative units) was adopted. Accord-
ing to the Audit Chamber, some research monotowns violate the provision 
on the obligatory transfer of at least 50 % of taxes to the municipality [5]. 
Another aspect of the budget system that has an adverse effect on 
monotowns is the widespread practice of integrating the regional component 
into the hierarchy of federal and local budgets. Within this system, federal 
transfer payment to closed towns are first received at the level of constituent 
entities of the Russian Federation. Technically, this procedure is nothing but 
an artificial barrier to the reception of necessary funds by closed towns. As a 
result both direct transaction costs and the period of fund transfer increase. 
This gives rise to suspicions about the consistency of the current public pol-
icy towards modern monotowns. 
The fourth cause of monotown’s vulnerability is the absence of an effec-
tive and comprehensive national programme for investment support. Accord-
ing to the State statistical service, in 2012, an average resident of a large 
monotown ‘received’ a little more than 75 % of average investment per a 
resident in a town with 100,000 population. As to foreign investment, the 
ratio was even lower — below 74 % [20]. In other words, monotowns are 
A. Shastitko, A. Fatikhova 
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less attractive to foreign companies (including those whose final beneficiar-
ies are Russian citizens investing through offshore companies). Moreover, 
the state does not take sufficient compensation measures. However, it does 
not mean that all monotowns need more public investment. At this stage, it is 
merely an element of diagnosis. Probably, in some cases, it is not 
monotowns but residents willing to move that require investment. 
Finally, it is a lack of public measures aimed at solving the internal prob-
lems of monotowns. Public policy towards monotowns is intermittent. The 
key characteristic of the measures taken is the absence of a comprehensive 
solution to the problem, disregard of their sources, a propensity for momen-
tary effects. In other words, the measures adopted by the Government are 
short-term and provide a temporary solution (for instance, the case of Pika-
lyovo [10]). Moreover, if the state takes measures to regulate the situation in 
monotowns, in most cases, they are aimed at those with a population of at 
least 50,000 people. Therefore, the only cause why one could expect any at-
tention to the monotowns of Kaliningrad region would be the special status 
of the region. The frequent use of subsidies and government grants for town-
forming companies within state programmes for economic development 
support only partially compensates for the negative effect and does not cre-
ate sufficient prerequisites for solving the problem. 
Therefore, a solution to the group of related issues, which is necessary 
not only for sustaining the national economy but, what is more important, for 
revitalising monotowns, requires a detailed approach. 
A search for an optimal solution to the monotown problem requires an 
accurate identification of structural risk-bearing factors. One should admit 
that the range of risks to successful development of monotowns (and, hence, 
social stability) is rather wide and cannot be identified unambiguously. In 
this case, it is logical to group risks based on the homogeneity of existing 
problems [42]. Let us consider a classification of typical monotown risks. At 
first, let us identify the direct risks of a town-forming company (‘business’), 
social risks (‘population’), and those of municipality (‘authorities’). Then 
potential risks associated with the interaction of these groups will be consid-
ered (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
 
Classification of typical monotown risks 
 
Subjects Risks and their description 
Business Infrastructural risks 
result from the malfunction of infrastructure facilities due to 
depreciation and a significant increase in the cost of infra-
structure maintenance. The most common causes are the use 
of infrastructure facilities beyond their operational lifetime, 
absent or overdue reconstruction and modernisation, the ab-
sence or insufficiency of conditions necessary for increasing 
technological capacities; exposure to environmental and cli-
matic factors and anthropogenic phenomena. 
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The end of table 1 
 
Subjects Risks and their description 
 
Technological risks 
are associated with the high cost of production processes and 
the introduction of stringent requirements to using fixed as-
sets. The highest risks relate to using assets beyond their op-
erational lifetime. 
Risks of deterioration in the standards of living Population 
Risks of human resource migration 
Authority Risks of municipalities 
correspond to the possibility of damages resulting from 
changes in the public policy and its priorities. Decisions 
made or the absence thereof, measures towards nationalisa-
tion and expropriation without compensation, force majeure 
(military actions, social unrest, etc.)  
Solvency risks 
relate to the solvency of an average resident. The probability 
of these risks increases with growing unemployment, salary 
reductions, and population aging. 
Authority/population 
Risks of reduction in human capital 
The threat of unpredictable losses associated with insuffi-
cient investment in professional and cultural capital, as well 
as general deterioration in the physical health of population. 
Consumer risks 
relate to the aspects connecting the demand for a company’s 
produce and services and their sales in consumer market.  
Product risks 
Acceptance (or a lack thereof) of the product in the market 
of a corresponding economic and industry specialisation  
Proprietary rights risks 
A possibility of expropriation of infrastructure facilities fol-
lowing force majeure and insurmountable circumstances. 
Authority/business 
Financial and economic risks 
relate to budget deficit and, therefore, insufficient funding of 
the monotown from the budget of a designated level. These 
risks result from the internal and external market situation, 
the condition of national economy and investment potential, 
banking system crisis, and inflation. 
Consumer risks 
Human resources risks 
are associated with such factors as fluctuations in the number 
of working age population, low living standards, and internal 
migrations resulting in structural changes in human re-
sources. 
Solvency risks 
Population/business 
Risks of reduction in human capital 
 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
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Risk management is the processes of identifying and assessing risks fol-
lowed by the development of a risk management strategy [25]. 
In ideal conditions, the above risks (present in part or in whole) should 
be identified and assessed as early as the stage of monotown development. 
Moreover, there is a need to devise a risk management strategy. In effect, 
one cannot speak of managing a certain monotown risks, since, despite the 
acute need for risk management, this problem is another element of the 
group of problems described above. 
 
3. Monotowns’ risk mitigation mechanisms 
 
Without aiming at broad generalisations, this section will demonstrate 
that monotown problems are not desperate and resettlement is not the most 
evident prospect in the case of an active reaction to the problem deteriora-
tion. At the same time, success stories show that typical solutions can be 
coupled with original ideas taking into account the local situation. 
An example of a successful solution to the monotown problem is pro-
vided by Canada, where the joint efforts of population, business, and mu-
nicipalities overcame the crisis of monotowns that seemed to be doomed to 
liquidation. Canadian practices can also be of interest, because the industry 
composition of the country’s monotowns is close to that in Russia. Let us 
analyse the measures taken to rehabilitate the economies of two Canadian 
towns — Tumbler Ridge and Elliot Lake. 
The town of Tumbler Ridge [39] was founded in Canada in the late 
1980s to support a major coal mining initiative. The new town’s population 
was 5,000 people. By 2000, the town-forming company Teck Corporation 
announced the closing of the largest mine, which threatened the town’s exis-
tence. The main idea of regional authorities was to liquidate the town and 
resettle the population. They stressed the town’s single-industry focus and 
the impossibility of taking standard measures to rehabilitate its economy. 
However, most residents and officials did not want to leave their hometown 
and believed that Tumbler Ridge’s economy can be saved and that it could 
turn from a specialised industrial centre into a prosperous economic centre. 
The municipality developed a detailed long-term strategy for the revitali-
sation of the doomed town. The strategy’s concept consisted in the stable 
provision of social services to the residents and support for the transport and 
engineering infrastructures. These measures suggested the creation of a sta-
ble social platform capable of not only enduring but also encompassing the 
diversification of its economy. The project was successful. An important ele-
ment of the policy planning was its division into long- and short-term as-
pects. The short-term strategy suggested concluding an agreement with the 
regional authorities on transfers from the regional budget to maintain the liv-
ing standards of the remaining population. The long-term one was aimed at 
diversification. Alongside meeting the social needs of the population, the 
local authorities were buying out the housing of those leaving the town and 
selling it at rather low prices. This initiative was welcome, since, after the 
reconstruction, the bought out houses were sold at extremely low prices 
ranging from USD 12,000 to 25,000. Therefore, more than 60 % of housing 
units were resold (725 houses and 260 flats out of 1,600 units). 
 Economics 
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Moreover, the quality of social services was improved — the level and 
accessibility of education, medical services, and social security were en-
hanced. Special relations with different organisations were established, 
which guaranteed the basic social package level throughout the transition 
period until the stabilisation of the internal economic situation. Social secu-
rity and available housing stimulated immigration — by 2002, 97 % of 
houses and flats were sold to new residents. 
Human capital increased as workforce was moving to the town. This 
made it possible to facilitate the development of small and medium busi-
nesses. For instance, services and recreation facilities started to open — the 
town witnessed rapid construction of small hotel facilities, restaurant chains, 
and car washes. Moreover, the town’s geographical position made it possible 
to launch a project on forestry development. Approximately 40 small and 
medium enterprises (further referred to as SMEs) opened in 2008 making a 
significant contribution to the town’s economic revival. In particular, a 2012 
survey showed that 53 out of 80 SME representatives declared their intention 
to develop their business in the town due to the favourable conditions [37]. 
Owing to the population inflow and, hence, stable transfers to the local 
budget, it became possible to adapt the existing infrastructure to the devel-
opment of new industries: rail lines were developed and large equipment 
maintenance facilities opened. This made it possible to estimate the actually 
employed area of the town and this reduce its size at the expense of un- and 
little-populated districts. Thus the campaign to rehabilitate Tumbler Ridge was 
completed. A trend towards turning the town into a tourist destination emerged. 
50 more companies specialising in hospitality were created. Today, the views of 
Tumbler Ridge can be seen at almost all Canadian tourist websites. 
Another Canadian town — Elliot Lake [33] — is another positive exam-
ple of a successful solution to the problem of town saving. The town’s econ-
omy was focused on uranium production. Elliot Lake faced a crisis in 1990. 
Ontario Hydro — the principal customer of the town-forming companies Rio 
Algom Limited and Denison Mines Limited — terminated its contract on 
uranium supply, because it had found a cheaper source of higher quality. The 
town-forming companies of Elliot Lake announced the decommissioning of 
three major mines; as a result, 2,000 people were laid off. In 1992, Denison 
Mines Limited closed down its business, and 1,100 more people were made 
redundant. The remaining 553 employees of Rio Algom Limited lost their 
jobs in July 1996. Elliot Lake’s economy fully dependent on the income of 
town-forming companies. As early as 1986, 4,858 people of the town’s 
17,984 population were employed at uranium production companies, 3,962 mo-
re worked in related fields producing goods and services used in the uranium 
production. In the early 1990s, the news of mass layoffs of working age 
population became a disturbing sign of the imminent demise of the town. It 
was accompanied by a grim forecast of population reduction (400—500 pe-
ople) by the beginning of 1997. In effect, the situation turned out differently; 
in 1994, the town’s population was 14,300 people, in 1997 14,500, including 
the employed population of 2,500. 
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Having faced a critical situation in the conditions of time pressure, insuf-
ficient funds, and a lack of experts in economics, the authorities decided to 
restructure the economy of the town, which had always depended on the 
mining industry. The objective was set to diversify the economy before the 
crisis arises. In 1987, the Economic Development Committee (further, 
Committee) was established; it devised the new plan to overcome the Elliot 
Lake crisis. 
The town-saving concept consisted in taking measures to attract invest-
ment and stabilise the economy using the existing resources and focusing on 
the short-term aspect. The concept was based on three initiatives: 1) retire-
ment living, 2) tourism, and 3) small business diversification. 
The Committee’s policy towards retirement age population focused on 
attracting retirees to Elliot Lake and encouraging their spending, which cre-
ated new opportunities for local businesses. In 1987, the senior partner of 
Denison Mines Limited and the town’s authorities made a decision to sell 
the workers’ empty houses to pensioners that had come to the town. Since 
the income of this population category is stabled and ensured by the state, 
retirees are not affected by the number of industries the town specialises in. 
At the same time, regular spending on consumer goods would make it possi-
ble to stabilise the local economy. Since the programme’s adoption and until 
the end of 1987, 27 people moved to the town. Later, the programme’s 
framework was adjusted; in 1991, the Committee established Elliot Lake 
Retirement Living, an independent non-profit corporation. It managed the 
abandoned housing and introduced the concept in neighbouring towns. In 
1993, Active Living, an estate agency from Ontario, expressed interest in 
buying out the houses and flats left by the emigrating population of such 
monotowns and selling them to retirees. Having set the price at USD 19,900, 
the company could hardly meet the demand. As a result, 3,600 people of re-
tirement and 3,000 people of working age had moved to Elliot Lake by 1997. 
Retirement Living became one of the largest regional companies selling real 
estate to retirees at affordable prices with a reserve of 1,520 housing units. 
This programme contributed not only to the creation of a safe “tax 
shield” for the municipality, but also to the attraction of SMEs selling furni-
ture and household equipment. As a result, more than $30 million is injected 
into the local economy on an annual basis. 
The second initiative to revive the town’s economy was tourism. Its ob-
jectives were almost identical to those of the retirement living programme — 
creating new opportunities for SMEs through attracting tourists to Elliot 
Lake and encouraging their spending. Surrounded by dense forest, numerous 
lakes, winding rivers, and hills, the town met most needs of the tourism in-
dustry. Before 1990, the town’s only tourism initiative was opening golf 
courses and skiing, hunting, and fishing facilities meant solely for the man-
agement of the uranium production corporations. 
The committee allocated the public funds, as well as those meant for cre-
ating new jobs, to building tourism infrastructure in Elliot Lake. The infra-
structure project included the construction of a 120 km bypass, an informa-
tion centre, and a platform with panoramic views, as well as smaller objects, 
such as boat ramps, garages, and hiking and snowmobile trails. 
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Thanks to an advertising campaign launched at first in Ontario and later 
in other neighbouring cities, Elliot Lake started to attract an increasing num-
ber of tourists coming mostly for short vacations. More than 47,000 tourists 
visited the town in 1993—1997. Numerous TV and radio commercials at-
tracted hunting and fishing aficionados, including TV stars, to Elliot Lake. 
Some of them stayed in the framework of the retirement living programme 
having concluded a one year contract for taping a TV show. The town 
gained popularity beyond Canada — Americans, Germans, and the British 
were coming there both as tourists and for permanent residence. 
The provision of an adequate level of hotel services contributed to the 
development of the town’s SMEs, which provided an increasingly wide 
range of goods and services. New hospitality and infrastructure facilities — 
hotels, bars, diners, etc. — were rapidly built. Moreover, Elliot Lake Retire-
ment Living expanded its operation from providing housing to retirees to 
organising two-day vacations (mostly for retirees) and creating new compa-
nies in the tourism industry. A corporation emerged that offered almost all 
types of tourist services — from regular to extreme ones. Their functioning 
required an organisation that would take on technical maintenance, devel-
opment, and equipment of the existing infrastructure. 
Finally, the third initiative concerned small and medium businesses. The 
Committee’s objective was to create new companies operating in different 
industries. As of early 1990, all the town’s companies operated in uranium 
production-related fields. After the Committee had been established, more 
than 200 volunteers expressed a wish to develop and attract new businesses. 
The economic diversification strategy admitted that local producers had 
already made all possible investments in the town’s development thus creat-
ing jobs for the working-age population. As a result, a decision was made to 
take additional measures contributing to the conversion of corporations, 
namely, the development of an alternative industry that could significantly 
reduce operating expenses. Local producers started to work together. Elliot 
Lake Mine Manufacturers’ Association was initiated by the town’s Commit-
tee. To reduce operating expenses, the Association developed a three-point 
strategy: creating short-term jobs, efficient energy use, and abolition of mu-
nicipal taxes. Alongside the funds allocated by the state to support the re-
gion’s economic development, the Committee devised a detailed business 
plan and carried out a study into financial management at production facili-
ties. These measures resulted in a decision to organise urgent regional and 
municipal fundraising to collect 25 million dollars for the development of bu-
sinesses in alternative industries. Over the next seven years, more than 30 com-
panies operating in different industries within the diversified economy were 
opened, which made it possible to increase the employment rate through at-
tracting 500—1,000 new workers each year. 
The cases of the Canadian towns of Tumbler Ridge and Elliot Lake show 
that even the most depressive and sparsely populated monotowns that were 
“doomed to death” due to a lack of prospects for the town-forming company 
can stabilise their economies and ‘revitalise’ their territories. The story of 
Tumbler Ridge shows that a town can be rehabilitated through providing 
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sustainable social services — it is crucial that the population is certain of 
their safety. Moreover, there is a need for a sound consideration of the objec-
tives and opportunities of short- and long-term planning and a competent 
estimate of the necessary spending. The case of Elliot Lake shows that the 
revitalisation of a town can become more rapid and efficient if the municipal 
treasury has sufficient funds for urgent and strategic spending; the local au-
thorities are a tested and efficient administrative unit; the town’s infrastruc-
ture is accessible and of high quality; and there is stable internal immigra-
tion. It is worth stressing the importance of the residents’ willingness to rem-
edy the town’s economic situation as well as that of cooperation between the 
municipality and the owners of town-forming companies. 
The Canadian practices are of interest not only as ‘success stories’ but 
also as an opportunity to analyse the structure of relations between the 
agents of institutional arrangements5. Let us consider the mechanisms behind 
each of them in detail. 
In the case of Tumbler Ridge, the town-forming company did not par-
ticipate in the town’s revitalisation (its closing necessitated these measures). 
Therefore, the authorities/population model is to be considered in this case. 
The external environment comprises the representatives of regional authori-
ties willing to close the town and resettle its residents. The internal environ-
ment is represented by the residents who do not want to move and the town’s 
administration. The population enters an agreement with the municipality: 
the former can provide the social basis for the economy’s diversification and 
further development if the latter ensures social safety (salaries, medicine, 
education, and infrastructure). In this process, the value of a monotown as a 
specific asset is lost. The municipality has to enter two ‘hierarchical’ agree-
ments — regional authorities/town (in the context of a short-term strategy it 
is equivalent to concluding an agreement on regional funding to ensure the 
provision of social services over the period required for diversification) and 
town/population ones (ensuring the provision of social services over a short-
term period in exchange for human resources necessary for long-term diver-
sification). In the town/population connection, an important role is played by 
a so called ‘add-in’ — the mediator (a superstructure over the population 
link in the corresponding structure of relations). The mediator is either 
elected by the population or it is an open position offered by the administra-
tion (in this case, almost any stakeholder can become the mediator). 
However, this mechanism generates a number of problems. Firstly, it en-
courages opportunistic behaviour: provision of social services without the 
formalisation or specification of the individual’s obligations increases the 
                                                     
5 In this case, we use the concept developed by Douglass North and Lance Davis in 
1971 [36]; it has found increasing usage in transaction cost theory due to the devel-
opment of a comparative analysis of structural alternatives of transaction perform-
ance in view of three important characteristics — uncertainty, frequency, and re-
source specificity. It is worth noting that Oliver Williamson — who formulated the 
principles of such analysis — used the case of a monotown or a company-town to 
illustrate the problems of establishing contractual relationships in the conditions of 
resource specificity in one of his most famous works [29].  
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risk that these obligations will not be met. Secondly, there is an increased 
risk of non-fulfilment of contractual obligations in both types of relation-
ships (regional authorities/town and town/mediator/population). Of course, 
the risk is significantly lower in the first case, since it is much easier to for-
malise the obligations of the parties. As to the second type of relationships, 
the situation is complicated by a lack of assurance from the population as to 
providing the municipality with the necessary human resources ‘on demand.’ 
Finally, the town/mediator/population relationship raises the question of as-
sessing the probability of information asymmetry. In particular, if the media-
tor is not selected according to the principle of aligning the interests of popu-
lation and municipality and is guided by their subjective ideas, there is a 
high probability that the other agents will receive incomplete information. 
As to the measures taken in the town of Elliot Lake, their structure re-
sembles that of measures adopted in Tumbler Ridge. The town-forming 
company did not enter the contractual relationships due to the termination of its 
operations. However, in the case of Elliot Lake, the regional authorities/town 
relationship is not considered. The initiative to save the town belonged to its 
administration, which produced the town/mediator/population relationship, 
however, the role of the mediator was rather significant, since it was as-
sumed by the Economic Development Committee [33] — the confluence of 
the administration’s and population’s interests. However, the further develop-
ment of short- and long-term strategy (attracting retirees for creating the ‘fi-
nancial shield,’ the development of tourism and recreation, and further diversi-
fication based on SMEs) is considered from the position of the mediator. 
In this case, the mechanism of obligation and assurance formalisation is 
simplified, which reduces the probability of both opportunistic behaviour 
and information asymmetry. The risk of non-fulfilment of obligations per-
sists; however, its degree is much lower. Nevertheless, this mechanism is 
associated with the following questions: is it possible to estimate the prob-
ability of the strategy’s positive outcome? Even if the housing resale project 
is successful (which is unlikely in the Russian conditions), will the inflow of 
retired population be stable? What should be done in the towns that, due to 
certain circumstances (for instance, climate and environmental conditions), 
cannot be attractive to immigrants? Is it possible to attract enough funds for 
industrial diversification and further development of SMEs through the de-
velopment of tourism and recreation? Finally, does it mean that success is 
guaranteed only in those towns where town-forming companies do not par-
ticipate in the institutional agreement? 
These questions call for a more comprehensive consideration of the 
problem of relationships in a monotown6. We are considering an institutional 
arrangement model with three initial components: the town-forming com-
pany (business), population, and authorities (the town’s administration). 
                                                     
6 It is assumed that this concerns monotowns of categories 1 and 2, which are the 
most vulnerable and characterised by an unstable socioeconomic situation. Towns of 
category 3 (characterised by a favourable situation) will not be considered in this 
context.  
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Since the decisions reached by the owners of the town-forming company 
often take precedence over the position of the head of the town’s administra-
tion, an appropriate point of reference is the choice of business alternatives — 
to support production (i.e. it is profitable) or discontinue it (if it is unprof-
itable or there is an increasing risk of an unfriendly takeover). The scheme 
given below shows possible scenarios for monotowns (fig. 2). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Possible scenarios for monotowns 
 
Business decides whether it is reasonable to maintain the operations. If 
the decision is positive, two alternatives are possible depending on whether 
additional adjustment are necessary (case B) or not (case A). 
● case A: all three agents are satisfied with the situation, the only thing 
required is regular monitoring in order to prevent unfavourable situations or 
to take opportune measures to forestall them. 
● case В: there is a need for certain adjustments to the existing institu-
tional arrangements. Since explicit threats have not been identified, the prob-
lem can be solved locally through improving employer/employee relations, 
revision of social obligations, and possible conclusion of an agreement of 
development programmes [26] (this is consistent with the busi-
ness/population, in very rare cases a triunique structures). 
If maintaining operations is not profitable (or possible) for the company, 
three situations (C, D, and E) can arise. 
 С suggests the liquidation of the town and resettlement. 
In the towns with a potentially depressive economic situation, where the 
costs of sustaining the town-forming company and the town artificially are 
not only high but also unreasonable, there is a need for the town and popula-
tion to reach an agreement (as the Canadian practices show) through a sur-
vey or an open election. In the case of mutual agreement on the unfeasibility 
of the town’s further development, there is a need to solve the resettlement 
problem (which results in a contract with the representatives of three levels 
of authorities — local, regional, and federal [26]). 
Support production 
Discontinues  
production 
A 
B 
С, D, E 
Business 
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 D suggests maintaining the asset specificity. 
Maintaining the asset specificity (in part or in whole) is possible if the 
town-forming company is taken over or merged with a company operating in 
the industry. In this situation, the basic relation is that between business and 
population, since it requires a solution to the problem of employer/employee 
relations, mainly, whether there is a need for retraining, how soon it should 
be completed, and how many employees will need it. There is also a need to 
reach a decision on the future of the non-working age population, whether it 
is reasonable for this cohort to stay in the town or to resettle, which will fa-
cilitate a reduction in the town’s area. 
 Е suggests that a specific asset is transformed into a general asset. 
1) transformation of a part of a specific asset into a general asset (for in-
stance, internal diversification, also in terms of industry composition at the 
town level); 
2) devaluation of a specific asset necessitates conversion to a general as-
set (for instance, in the case of external diversification, i.e. if the town-
forming company is taken over with further conversion). 
Since the general characteristic of this scenario is the transformation of a 
specific asset into a general one (to a significant degree), it is reasonable to 
suppose that some of the monotown’s residents will resettle due to both the 
change in the industrial profile and other reasons. Therefore, one can expect 
some instances of migration between towns/cities (not necessarily of the sin-
gle-industry type; it is more important to focus on the way to ensure migra-
tion inflows). Since the success of industrial diversification is based on a 
stable labour market, the initiatives of the business/authorities structural el-
ement should be aimed at attaining this objective as the first priority. This 
requires minimisation of switching costs for the population group. There-
fore, the actions of the business/authorities subgroup should be coordinated 
and aligned with the following logical structure: creating jobs — providing 
infrastructure (with allowance for the changes in the housing market) — en-
suring safety and safeguarding proprietary rights — providing social ser-
vices (education, medicine, etc.) — making utilities available — providing 
sociocultural services. 
In other words, the ‘default’ situation suggests the readiness of the popu-
lation to provide human resource, however, the actions of both the authori-
ties and business (thus we examine their interaction) should be aimed at cre-
ating the most favourable conditions for the development of a stable labour 
market. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study of monotowns within the concept presented in the article made 
it possible to arrive at the following conclusions. 
 A solution to the monotown problem using a wide range of different 
tools requires the formalisation of the concept of ‘monotown.’ 
 Monotowns’ vulnerability is not an isolated phenomenon, on the con-
trary, it encompasses a number of aspects — ranging from the system ties 
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between the competitive and industrial policy concerning the produce of 
town-forming companies to the state policy’s intermittent, situational meas-
ures taken to sustain monotowns. 
 The aggregate of various risks can be presented within a single refer-
ence frame, if they are considered and classified from the perspective of a 
comparative analysis of institutional arrangements. 
 A study into the relations between the key monotown stakeholders can 
and should take into account the problem of opportunistic behaviour, which 
is especially pronounced due to high switching costs. 
 International practices show that it is possible to successfully mitigate 
the risks associated with monotowns. At the same time, the success stories 
suggest that rather generic solutions can be complemented with original 
ideas (in view of local particularities) requiring considerable efforts in de-
signing relations between the key stakeholders. 
 Putting aside specific examples, one can put together a general scheme 
of interaction between the counter-agents of institutional arrangements in the 
context of a monotown and identify the general mechanism aimed at solving 
monotowns’ problems. 
It is worth stressing that the proposed measures are aimed at alleviating 
the situation in monotowns with pronounced socioeconomic problems and 
suggest a solution that is alternative to those offered at the moment, namely, 
direct intervention of the federal and regional authorities consisting in the 
liquidation and conservation of the most vulnerable monotowns. The pro-
posed approach can be used in studying of and searching for solutions to the 
problems of the most depressive monotowns, since it encompasses the key 
scenarios and suggest taking into account the relations between major stake-
holders. 
However, due to the lack of an integrated and detailed framework for 
solving problems through coordinating different mechanisms of institutional 
arrangements agreements in the Russian practices — the practical applica-
tion of this methods requires further development both in terms of further 
specification and application to specific objects, namely, different monotown 
categories. 
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